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Abstract. Recently, botnets utilizing peer-to-peer style communication
infrastructures have been discovered, requiring new approaches to detection and monitoring techniques. Current detection methods analyze network communication patterns, identifying systems that may have been
recruited into the botnet. This paper presents a localized botnet communication model that enables a portion of compromised systems to
hide from such detection techniques without a potentially signiﬁcant increase in network monitoring points. By organizing bot systems at the
the subnet level the amount of communication with the outside network
is greatly reduced, requiring switch-level monitoring to identify infected
systems.

1

Introduction

One of the most potent threats in the Internet society is the botnet [15, 4, 9]. A
botnet is a collection of compromised computer systems throughout the world
which are under the control of a single entity, the “botmaster.” The distributed
nature of a botnet may enable an attacker to gather larger amounts of conﬁdential personal information over a shorter period, or execute a denial-of-service
attack in a quick and overpowering manner.
Botnets have traditionally taken a centralized approach to the management of
the compromised bot systems. Recently, a powerful botnet that utilizes peer-topeer style communication, Storm Worm, has been the cause of various incidents
of malicious activity. Tracking the origin and activity of this botnet is much
more diﬃcult due to the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communication infrastructure.

2

Related Work

Traditionally botnets have relied on a centralized command and control (C&C)
communication infrastructure utilizing IRC servers as a means to manage the
remote bot systems [12, 7, 3]. A security administrator is able to monitor these
systems by identifying the location of the C&C IRC server and logging in posing as a compromised bot system [1, 2]. Depending on the conﬁguration of the
A. Das et al. (Eds.): NETWORKING 2008, LNCS 4982, pp. 624–632, 2008.
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server, various characteristics of the botnet can be identiﬁed including population and command instructions. Honeypots are systems deployed by security
administrators that act as infection targets and allow administrators to detect
botnet activity [4, 10, 18]. Various techniques for evading detection exist, which
hide or masquerade botnet communication activity [16, 6, 9].
More recently, botnets utilizing a peer-to-peer (P2P) [17, 13] style communication infrastructure have been proposed [16, 7] and even discovered in the
wild [11]. It is very diﬃcult to ascertain the characteristics of a P2P botnet because it is not possible to monitor a centralized location where all infected bots
connect as such a location does not exist.
To the best knowledge of the authors’, Bothunter [8] is the most eﬀective
tool for detecting the existence of a bot within a local network, including bots
utilizing P2P style communication. The following section discusses Bothunter in
more detail and discusses our approach to evading detection by Bothunter.

3

Evading BotHunter Detection

BotHunter relies on the ability to identify an infection dialog in order to detect the existence of a bot within a managed network. This paper proposes a
communication method that negates the eﬀective detection techniques of traﬃc
monitoring systems by minimizing the amount, and controlling the type, of trafﬁc that passes through a network monitor node, while at the same time enabling
infected systems to receive all appropriate commands and instructions from the
botmaster.
Bothunter is centered on the ability to detect ﬁve distinct events:
–
–
–
–
–

E1:
E2:
E3:
E4:
E5:

External to Internal
External to Internal
Internal to External
Internal to External
Internal to External

Inbound Scans
Inbound Exploits
Binary Acquisition
C&C Communication
Outbound Infection Scanning

In order to declare a bot infection an E2 AND one E2-E5 events, or two E2E5 events must be observed. Thus, to evade detection a bot must be able to
actively participate in the global botnet while eliminating events which may lead
to its detection. As such, we propose the following alternatives to the previously
described events that accomplish the same purpose, but in a diﬀerent manner.
– A2: Internal to Internal Exploits
– A3: Internal to Internal Binary Acquisition
– A4: Internal to Internal C&C Communication
A key factor in IDS techniques is that event correlation is tied to a single interior
host. As the following section shows, infected systems can coordinate with each
other to share the burden or communication with the external botnet parties,
thus eliminating the bond between a single system and all external communication events.
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Local Network “Sub-Botnet”

This section describes the process of creating and managing a local area network
“sub-botnet.” The creation process results in a coordinated group of bots in a
switched portion of a network. The following are important assumptions about
the network environment. Note that these assumptions may not be true of all
networks, but we believe are common in typical enterprise networks.
– Communication within a switched network does not penetrate the router,
other than deﬁned protocols such as DHCP proxy.
– IDS-type monitors do not process information that does not move from the
internal to external interface, or vice-versa, of the router.
– Switches utilized as network monitoring points do not have (or are not used
for) IDS capabilities (typically used for monitoring bandwidth).
4.1

Initial Infection

A system can become infected by a malicious bot program in a number of ways,
each ending with the same result of the system becoming part of a botnet.
Initially, at least one system in the network must become infected and obtain
the botnet binary in some way. We assume that this initial infection avoids
detection by some means such as proposed in [8]. Once the initial bot has been
created, the organization of the sub-botnet can begin.
The ﬁrst order of business for the initial bot is to compromise local network
systems, minimizing the chance of external E2 events. First, the initial bot checks
its host system for vulnerabilities and assumes other local systems have the
same vulnerability. Thus, the initial bot can attempt targeted exploits at other
systems, without using noisy port scanning activities.
Next, the initial bot monitors network traﬃc to identify the IP and MAC
addresses of systems within the locally switched network. DHCP requests, ARP
messages, and other broadcast traﬃc enables the initial bot to identify many of
these systems without using port-scanning activities.
After determining probable valid exploits and potential targets, the initial bot
can proceed to create a sub-botnet by attempting to compromise other systems,
an A2 event. When a system is compromised, vulnerabilities can be patched,
preventing future E2 events.
4.2

New E2 Discovery

While A2 infections are desirable over E2 infections, it is not feasible to infect
all possible systems with A2 events alone. When an E2 infection occurs, the
newly infected system can better protect itself from being detected if it avoids
unnecessary E3-E5 events. To do so, the newly infected system must discover if
another system in the local network is part of the botnet. If such a bot exists,
the newly infected system can obtain the bot binary and other communication
from systems within the local network. The newly infected bot relies on bots
already infected to provide the necessary information.
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While the initial bot monitors the network to identify potential victims systems, it also seeks to identify newly infected systems. This can we accomplished
in a number of ways including identifying a pre-determined pattern of DHCP
Request messages [5]. This is enabled by an error prevention mechanism in the
DHCP protocol. When a system issues a DHCP request it can repeat the request
approximately four seconds later [5] if a response is not received. As this part
of the protocol does not occur commonly, it can act as an “announcement” of
a newly infected system. Upon observing this duplicate request sequence, the
initial bot identiﬁes the MAC address of the source machine and can direct a
message to the newly infected system “welcoming” it to the botnet.

5

Sub-Botnet Management

As mentioned in Section 3 there are certain event dialogs which can be detected
as a bot infection by BotHunter. In order to avoid detection the events that
each bot may initiate must be controlled. To illustrate this point let (A2 ∨
A3 ∨ A4) ≡ α, (E3 ∧ E4) ≡ β, and (E2 ∧ (E3 ∨ E4)) ≡ γ. It follows that
α ∧ ¬β ∧ ¬γ ≡ α ∧ ¬(β ∨ γ) ≡ δ where δ is an undetectable state and that
β ∨ γ ≡ η where η is a detectable state. Therefore, it is necessary to control bot
actions such that only δ occurs within a given timespan as BotHunter or any
IDS Correlator will have to eventually prune old events from each internal host’s
infection dialog.
The core goal of the management system is to limit the botnet’s monitorable
exposure to a single bot at any given time. This oﬀers the potential to avoid detection by a perimeter-style IDS Correlator by exceeding the correlator’s pruning
threshold or by event sharing. Since the IDS Correlator must eventually prune
old events, a round-robin type duty passing algorithm has the potential to allow
external botnet communication without any of the bots every being detected.
To this end the sub-botnet will make use of a Token Bot (TB), which will
perform the internal to external actions, and an internal report peer list to
share traceable events amongst all the bots in the the subnet. In the pursuit
of detection avoidance the Sub-Botnet management scheme must assure that
each bot only performs one internal to external (E2-E4) event within a given
timespan. Further, it is desirable that each bot performs the same E3 or E4
event each time it initiates said event and that only one bot is engaged in such
an event at any given time.
In order to ensure this scenario the sub-botnet institutes a token passing
scheme, where only the TB may initiate internal to external bot communication.
Assuming there are two or more bots present in the sub-botnet, a token passing
and resource sharing framework can be used. The basic token passing process is
as follows: 1) Token Acquisition (TAQ), 2) perform Token Action (TAC) known
as an E3 or E4 event, 3) issue Token Report Request Broadcast (TRRB) and
compile token, 4) start Token Action Result Propagation (TARP) qualifying as
an A3 or A4 event, and 5) the Token Pass. If there are any issues which prevent

628

B. Shirley and C.D. Mano

the TB from performing all these actions, then a Token Election (TE) will take
place to recover the token. The TB will also acknowledge new bots infected via
E2 infection and send them the bot binary. As far as A2 events are concerned
the bot that initiated the A2 event will be charged with handling the A3 event
for the newly infected bot. Full details of the token passing model are available
in [14]
5.1

Token Acquisition (TAQ)

In this phase a bot will have the token passed to it through some variation
of what will be referred to as a Token Pass (TP) process. The TP may have
occurred explicitly due to TB failure or implicitly as part of the normal TP
procedure. The token includes the following:
– Report list - internal only peer list
– Action History - the last two internal to external actions performed (E3 or
E4 events)
– Timestamp - indicative of when token was compiled
– Bot Binary Version - denotes the current binary version
The Report list is the primary tool used for token passing and token election
should token passing fail. The TAC for a given bot is implied by the information
in the Report list. The new TB is listed in the Report list along with the action
to be performed. Ideally this will be the same action it performed last time,
or it may be a diﬀerent action if bot action restructuring has occurred. Either
way, the action listed should match with the action missing from the two-entry
history list.
5.2

Perform Token Action (TAC)

The TB will perform the action designated by the Report list; either a command
update request, a peerlist update, or a binary update check. The peerlist update
will always be performed, but the other two actions may result in no update.
The peerlist update will be largely handled by an external peer on the TB’s
peerlist. Assuming the TB ﬁnds a responsive peer, the TB will have that peer
get an updated peerlist and send it back so the TB can propagate the list to the
subnet. The command update request and binary update check will essentially
work the same for the TB as they would for an external peer, except that the
TB must propagate the result of its action to the subnet.
5.3

Token Report Request Broadcast (TRRB)

Upon completion of the TAC the TB will issue a TRRB to which any viable local
bot will reply, as shown in Figure 1. Each bot will reply with its last performed
action, a timestamp indicative of when that action was performed, and its bot
binary version. The TB will compile and update the action history and report
lists, and associate a timestamp with the update.
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Fig. 1. Token bot issuing TRRB, and the subsequent responses from the currently
active bots in its subnet

5.4

Token Action Result Propagation (TARP)

Assuming a successful TRRB, the TB will have an updated report list which
includes all currently active bots in its subnet. The TB will use the Report list
as the means for passing the update information to the sub-botnet. The TB will
send the Report list, the update, the current Bot Binary version and the action
history to a bot in the report list. In essence it is passing a copy of the token,
as shown in Figure 2.
5.5

Token Pass

The TB will use the information in the token to decide which bot will receive
the token next. It will consult the action history in order to see which action
needs to be performed next. At this time the TB will scan the report list looking
for bots whose last action matches the next necessary action. Once the TB has
a list of these bots it will select the bot with the oldest timestamp and pass the
token to that bot.
5.6

Token Election (TE)

The TE request is a catch-all method for handling any token action failure.
The TE request will generally occur after some set waiting period has expired
without a response from the TB, therefore, it is possible that multiple bots will
request a TE within the same timespan. A bot that issues the TE request will
wait for responses for a set time period and if no other TE requests are received
it issues a broadcast that TE was successful.
The bot that issues the TE success broadcast will use the history list and the
most up-to-date report list that it received to pick a new TB. The method for
choosing a new TB will be essentially the same as the method used for passing
the token. Once the bot ﬁnds a suitable responsive bot it will pass the token
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Fig. 2. Token bot passing a “copy” of the token as part of TARP

to that bot. At this point the new bot will make the TAQ broadcast and the
sub-botnet may resume normal activity. Details on handling simultaneous TE
requests is presented in [14]

6

Analysis

While the proposed system is able to eﬀectively evade detection from traditional
IDS and dialog-based botnet detection systems, it is not immune from other
defense mechanisms. An increased level of monitoring and traﬃc analysis would
enable this system to be detected.
As with traditional worm, virus, and botnet threats, our proposed system
has deﬁned “signatures” that allow it to be detected. An important diﬀerence
between this model and others, however, is that the network traﬃc signatures
do not pass through network devices traditionally used for identifying malicious
network activity.
A2 Events: A2 infection events target speciﬁc hosts and thus, do not expose the
initial bot the way port scanning activities can. This activity is identical to an
E2 event except that it originates interally to the network. Thus, the signature
has only changed in the source of the data.
Announcement Message: The announcement message generated by a newly
infected system must be a valid broadcast message, but must be a custom message or a relatively uncommon one such that the TB does not respond to noninfected systems regularly. In either case, the broadcast announcement message,
once identiﬁed, is a signature of the botnet.
Token Passing/Management: In many locally switched networks, such as a
university computer lab, it is not common for individual system to communicate
directly with each other. The presence of even small data ﬂows between systems
in the switched network may be sign of questionable activity.

A Model for Covert Botnet Communication in a Private Subnet

631

Detection Requirements
As has been shown, a covert switch-based communication model has a number
of unique signatures that can be used by a detection mechanism. Thus, by incorporating a suﬃcient set of monitoring nodes throughout the network, sub-botnet
activity can be detected. In essence, the level of protection is directly correlated
to the level of monitoring.
In order to be able to identify all of the covert communication methods proposed in this paper, it becomes necessary to implement IDS capable monitoring
at all switch devices in a network. Incorporating this level of monitoring may
pose a problem for large networks due to the sheer amount of data that might
be generated. However, as monitoring at the switch level seeks to identify very
speciﬁc type of “special case” attacks, the analysis of the network traﬃc may be
able to be done in a simple manner.

7

Summary and Future Work

This paper presented a potential communication model for covert botnet communication. This model enables a group of systems within a switched subnet to
participate in a global botnet infrastructure without generating communication
patterns that would allow an external monitoring system to identify the compromised hosts. While the proposed system can be detected, it requires an in-depth
monitoring infrastructure above what is typical in many enterprise networks.
The future work of this project is aimed at creating an eﬃcient IDS-type
switch-based internal botnet communication monitoring system. The system will
potentially act as a remote data gathering node for BotHunter to be able to correlate internal traﬃc patterns with internal/external patterns. It is hypothesized
that such system will minimize the logging and computational requirements on
an individual switch monitor and improve the overall accuracy of the system.
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